Abstract: Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problern with a policy of deter rence is that the th reat of r etaliation may not be credible if retaliation Ieads to a worse outcome -perhops a nuclear holocaust -than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first str ike and not retaliating. -The optimality of deterrence is analyz.ed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, in which each player chooses a probability (or Ievel) of preemption, and of retaliotion if preempted. The Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, in this gome a r e compared with those in a Star Wars Game, in which the preemption and ret aliation Ievels are constrained by the defensive capabilities of each side. Unlike t hreats in the Deterrence Game, which can always stabiliz.e t he cooperat ive outcome, mutual preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wors Game, underscoring the problern -particularly if defensive capobilities are unbalanced -that deterrence will be subverted by the development of Star Wars.
destruction'. The inclu slon of mutual in the MAD doctrine implies thot each side con destroy the other, even if attacked first; this reciprocal vulnerability is presumed to make deterrence stable, at least as long as the mutual destruction is 'assured'.
Sometimes MAD is used to denote 'mutual ossured deterrence', with the mean s for assuring deterrence not necessaril y assumed to be the destruction of society. Other terminology is less lurid t han MAD. 'Cou nter volue', which is stressed in the doctrine of mutual ossured destruction, refers to the destruction of eitles ond industries, whereas 'counte rforce' stresses the dest r uction of militory forces, porticularly missile s ites, and command ond control focilities . Still different strategies s uch a s 'domage-limit ation' ond 'wor-fig hting' defenses ofter a limited nuclear a t tack -shou ld deterrence fall -are also discussed in t he national-security Iiterat ur e ond are now port of the nucleor ve rnocular.
The rother orcone debote obout nuclear deterrence ond it s alte rnati ves is generolly not about whether one should respond to attock, but how. Here our concern is brooder -with the nature of deterrence itself: t he conditlons under which one should respond to an ottack, with what degree of certainty, ond at whot Ievel. Our purpose is not so much to describe optimal threats to deter an opponent -though such prescriptions will come out of the models we describe -but rather to show that deterrence is amenoble to rational onolysis. The foundotion of this analysis is the mathematical theory of games, whose application to the problern of deterrence helps to clorify the main strotegic issues.
Before attempting to op ply t his t heory directly, consider what general argument con be used to justify dete rrence, assuming that it is costly for o th r eotener to corry out a threot if ottocked. While conceding that it is irrational to car ry out a threat in a single play of a game, one might arg ue that it may weil be rational in repeated play (Broms/Hesse! 1984) . The reoson is thot a carried-out threot enhonces one's credibility -in doing the opporently irrational thing in o single ploy -so thot, over the long run, one can develop a s ufficiently fear some reputotion to de ter future opponent s . Thereby , a lthough losing on occasion in the shor t run, one can gain over time.
British Prime Minister Morga ret Thatcher evidently made this calculation when she responded to Argentina's invasion of the Folkland l slands in 1982 by dispatehing t he British fleet. The conflict was ve ry domaging to bot h sides, but Britain's succes s f ul Invasion left little doubt about t hat country's resolve in future territorial disputes, such as might occur over Gibroher.
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This is not o sotisfoctory argument, however, if corrying out o threot Ieads to something os unthinkoble ond irredeemoble os nucleor war between the superpower s, which probably would occur only once. Unlike deterrence in o conventional conflict -between , soy, o superpower ond a smoller country without nucleor weopons, in which one's willingness to corry out o threot will offect one's reputotion in future conflicts -credibility in o gome without a sequel is purely acodemic.
To model deterrence between two nucleor powers, we begin with the twoperson gome of Chicken, in which eoch player con choose between two strategies: cooperate (C) and do not cooperote (C), which in the context of dete rrence may be thought of os 'do not ottock' ond 'ottack', respectively. These strotegies Iead to four possible outcomes, which the ployers ore assumed to rank from best (4) to wars t ( 1). These rankings ore shown os order ed poirs in the outcome motrix of Figure 1 , with the first number indicoting the rank a ssigned by the row ployer (colled "Row"), ond the second number indicating the rank ossigned by the column player (colled "Column"). Chicken is defined by the following outcome rankings of the two player s:
1. 8oth ployers cooperote (CC) -next-best outcome for both ployers: (3,3). 2. One player cooperotes ond the other does not (CC ond CC) -best ou tcome for the ployer who does not cooperote ond next-worst for the ployer who does: (2,4) ond (4,2). 3. Bot h ployers do not cooperote (CC) -warst outcome for both ployers:
( 1' 1) .
Out comes (2,4) ond (4,2) in Figure 1 are circled to indicote thot they ore Nash eguilibrio: neither player (Row or Column) would hove an incentive uniloterolly to deport from these Outcomes becouse he would do wo rse lf he did. For exomple, from (2,4 ) Row would do worse if he moved to ( 1, 1), and Column would do worse if he moved to (3, 3) . By cont rost, from (3,3) Row would do better if he moved to (4,2), ond Column would do better if he moved to (2,4 ).
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0o not OOOI>O'"ete ICI The shorthand verbal descriptio n s given fo r each outcome in Figure 1 suggest the vexing problern the players face in choosing between C and ~: by choosing ~. each can 'win' but risks disaster; by choosing C, each might benefit from compromise but could also 'lose'. Each Nash equilibrium shown in Figure 1 favors one player over the other, but the stability of these equilibria as such says nothing about which of the two -if eitherwill be chosen.
Although the (3,3) compromise outcome is t he obvious candidate for the player s to agree on, its instability would seem to rule it out as o durable solution. At some point each player might be tempted to depart from it to 'win', or at least threoten the other player with preemption.
One effect of t hreats in Chicken is not hard to grasp. If, say, Row threatens Column with the chaice of C, and th is threat is regarded a s credible, Column's best response is C , Ieeding to (4,2}, an apparent win for Row and loss for Column.
Clearly, the player with the credible threat -if there is one -can force the other player to back down in order to ovoid ( 1,1}. Although Row would 'win' in this case by getting his best ou t come, Column would not 'lose' in the usual sense by getting his warst outcome but rather his nextworst.
This fact illustrates that Chicken is not o constant -sum game, in which what one player wins t he other loses. T hat is why we have put 'win' and 'lose' in quotation marks here and in Figure 1 . In variable-sum games like Chicken, the sum of the players' payoffs at each outcome (if measured cardinally by utilities rat her than ordinall y by ranks) is not constant but variable. This meons that both players may do better at some outcomes (for example, (3, 3}} than at others (for example, (1, 1)).
The Deterrence Game is based on Chicken but adds two refinements: (i} the players can make quanti t ative choices of Ievels of cooperation (or noncooperation), not just qualitative choices of C or C; (ii) once these Initial choices, which can be interp reted as Ievels of nonpreemption (or preemption), are made, the less preemptive player may choose a subsequent Ievel or retaliation ( Brams/Kilgou r 1985a; 1985b).
To illustrate play in th is game, consider the extreme case in which Row chooses maximum preemption and Column chooses no preemption initiall y. Thus, if the game starts out at (3,3}, Row's preemption maves it to (4,2}, as shown by arrow A in Figure 1 . If we assume that the players have complete Information about each other's Initial choices, the r e would be no doubt that Row preempted; Column could then retaliate.
Now here comes the r u b for Column, the player who cooperoted initioll y. lf he responds to Row's preemption and moves the gome to (1, 1), os illustroted by arrow B, he succeeds not only in punishing Row but also himself. This is p recisel y what mokes retoliotion in the Deter rence Game problemotic: it would be better for Column to copitulote, occepting his next-worst outcome (4,2), than ovenge Row's preemption by moving the gome to ( 1,1) 1 the disostraus outcome for both players.
True, if re venge in this situotion is volued more highly thon defeat by Column, there is nothing ir r ational obout Column's choosing retribution ogoinst Row. But this choice is incampatible with the Figure 1 poyoffs; moreover, revenge might be especially hord for o superpower to justify ofter suffering o limited nuclear ottack that the vast mojority of its populotion survives or, more reolistically 1 o lorge-scale conventionol attock, such os by the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Nuclear reprisol, ofter oll, would olmost surely result in o full-scole nuclear exchange 1 whose consequence mlght weil be a nucleor winter in which everybody perishes.
Jf the rankings of outcomes in Figure 1 accurately describe the problem of retoliotion in o nucleor confrontation between the superpowers, how con o policy of deterrence be justified that poses the threat of nucleor war and perhops mutual onnihilation? The superpowers in effect circumvent the problem of rationolly responding to a first strike by irrevocably precommitting themsel ves to retaliate if ottacked (Broms 1985) . Thereby they preclude themselves from moking conciliotory choices ot the very point ot which it might be prudent to step back from the precipice.
In fact 1 commond ond control procedures that both superpowers now hove in ploce specify preselected torgets thot will be hit once o first strike of a porticular mognitude is de. tected. Even if the president is incopocitated 1 authority for the launehing of o retaliotory strike devolves (to lower Ievels of commond) to ensure that such o strike will actuolly be carried out (Brocken 1983; Blair 1985; Ford 1985; Lebow 1987 ; Corte r/Steinbruner/ Zraket 1987).
All this smocks of o 'doomsday mochine' 1 which responds independently of human decisionmakers. This is an exoggeration, of course, but it probably is occurote to speok of o 'probobilistic doomsday machine' (PDM) -one with built-in uncertointies due to possible foilures in C'I (commond 1 COilTI'Iunication 1 control 1 an d intelligence) 1 including the lock of will of political decisionmokers to order a second strike os weil os o variety of technicol problems thot might orise.
ls o PDM sufficient to deter o flrst strike by an opponent? In principle 1 thls will depend on whether the opponent thinks he con do better by attacking or by not attacking. Assume, for illustration, that the ranks in Figure 1 are cardinal utili ties, or actual values, that each player associates with the four outcomes. lf p is the probability that the PDM will function properly when one player -say, Row -attacks the other, then Column can deter Row if the payoff that Row obtains from not attacking, 3, is greater than the expected payoff he obtains from attacking. In thi s case, Row will obtain 4 with probability 1-p (PDM does not work so Column will not retaliate) and 1 with probability p (Column will retaliate). This calculation can be expressed by inequality 3 > 1p + 4(1-p), which is equivalen t to p > 1/3.
In other words, Row will be weil advised not to attack if Col umn's PDM has a greater than 1/3 chance of teiggering retaliation. lf the consequences of retaliation were much worse than 1 ( for exomple, some !arge negative value, which might be the case in a nuclear conflict), only a very small probability p of retaliation would be required to make a first strike unprofitable if not perilous for the attacker.
Patently, certain retaliation is not necessary to deter an Opponent in the Deterrence Game, at least one who makes the kind of expected -payoff calculation we have illu s trated. In international conflicts, especially those that might involve nuclear weapons, there is abundant evidence that national decisionmakers are not reckless but, in fact, rather conservative in their choice of means to satisfy their goals.
Of course, we may not shar e their goals or even sympathize with them. This fact, howeve r, is not consequential if we have a fairly good idea of what their goals are and, specifically, how they e valuate the possible outcomes that may occur. Given that they rank outcomes as in Figure 1 , there will be some p less than 1 that will render the expected payoff obtained from ottack (and subsequent retaliation) less than that obtained from not attacking.
This calculus, nevertheless, does not gainsay that retaliation is always costly to the player attacked in the Deterrence Game. This is why, to make his threat of retaliation credible, he must p~ecommit hirnself to retaliate with a p above the threshold value we have illustrated.
The superpowers have made themselves credible by, in effect, constructing PDMs -somewhat beyend the control even of their top Ieaders -who might, conceivably, prefer to su rrender in a crisis rather than retaliate against a first strike. The fact that they may not be able to countermand the PDM en sures that precommitments to retaliate are credible.
Probabilistic threats of retaliation that deter an attack will presumably depend on the Ievel of the attack. As the Ievel increases and the fir st strike bring s the ottocker closer to his highest poyoff ( before retoliotion), the r etoliotor will hove to increose his Ievel of retoliotion in order to reduce the ottocker's poyoff to an omount below whot the ottocker would get if he hod not ottocked in the first ploce.
Visuolly, one might think of the Deterrence Game os ployed an o squore boord, whose four corners give the poyoffs shown for Chicken in Figure  1 . If Row ottocks by moving the outcome verticolly from (3,3) towordbut not necessorily reoching -(4,2), Column con respond by moving horizontolly from left to right, closer to ( 1,1). This will decreose Row's poyoff, so t hot given Row's Ievel of ottock, ot some point on the boord defined by Column's Ievel of response, Row will be indifferent between ottocking ond not ottocking. Retoliotion thot corries the outcome to the right of this point, closer to ( 1, 1), will definitely be worse for Row thon stoying ot (3,3).
We ossume in the Deterrence Game thot the ployers' poyoffs vory continuously os o function of the distonces from the four corners of the boord. Eoch con deter his opponent by threotening retoliotion ot some Ievel greoter thon thot which couses indifference.
We hove colculoted, in o voriotion of the Deterrence Game colled t he Threot Game, the minimal Ievels of retoliotion thot ore required to deter ottocks ond hove discovered thot o policy of tit-for-tot rep r isols may not be the best deterrent (B r oms/Kilgour 1987). i n many coses, o mare-thonproportionote response is optimal ogoinst relotively minor oggression, o less-thon-proportionote response ogoinst relotively major oggression. The precise Ievels -ond the t hreshold ot which 'mare' becomes 'less' -depend on the poyoffs of the underlying gome of Chicken.
Historicolly, we will never know whether o strong policy of resistonce ogoinst Hitler's eorly incursions would hove preven ted World War II. Nor con we predict thot, ofter o limited nucleor first strike by one superpower, o diminished response on the port of the other will prevent Wo rld War 111. There ore, nonetheless, good rational reosons to believe thot an effective deterrent may be one in which the Ievel of retoliotion is toilored more or less -but not strictl y -to the Ievel of oggression. By hitting relotively hord when the provocotion is smoll, ond bocking off somewhot when lorge-scole conflict might prove cotostrophic, one moy ot the some time discouroge 'solomi toctics' ond defuse oll-out escolotion should deter rence foil.
These results Support o modified tit-for-tot policy or, in the porlonce of the U. S. Defense Deportment, "flexible response" or "groduoted deterrence" . But our results ore more precise thon these qualitative doctrines; they provide quantitative guidelines of the punishment thot should be threatened in relation to the Ieve l of attack (Brams/Kilgour 1987). Speciflcally, as aggres sion increases, retaliation shou ld also increase, but at a decreasing rate. Whether the threshold retaliation need be more than the aggression at low Ievels depends on the specific payoffs in the game, but at high Ievels one need never threaten retaliatian cOI'TTTlensurate with t he provocation ta deter it. The reason is s imple: such a policy will move the game toward the mutually worst (1,1) outcome, which moy be far worse than t he (3,3) outcome; rational deterrence can always be achleved without the threat of such 'overkill'.
The (3,3) outcome is in fact a Nash equilibrium in the Deter rence Game and Threat Game when backed up by threats above the minimum Ievel neces sary to deter. In other words, the cooperative outcome in Chicken, which is not in equilibrium, can be stabilized by threats -at least if they are considered credible by an opponent .
What helps moke t hem credible is that the threatener does not suffer unnecessarily great damoge in carrying them out, making his precommitment to such retaliation more plausible. Alt hough the threatened retaliation probably should be somewhat above the minimum Ievel to guard against possible misperceptions or miscalculations by an opponent, it should never Iead to complete devastation af the threatener. Otherwise it would appear incr edible; the potential oggressor, suspecting such retaliatian would never be carried out, might attack on this v'er y presumption. lt is unfortunate, perhops, that the palpable fear of annihilation rather than simple good will has prevented nuclear war for for ty yeor s . Yet good will alone is insufficient to sustoin (3,3) in Chicken precisely becouse it is rational to defect from t his cooperative outcome. Threots in the Threot Game -sometimes entoiling retaliotion greater than smoll-scale oggression, but always diminishing in proportion to increosing oggression -can, however, render deter rence rational.
The superpowers have flirted with their own extinction to make deterrence work. Ronald Reogon's SOl (S trategie Defense Initiative, or 'Star Wors'), which purports to provide o defense ogainst nucleor weopons ond overt an apocalypse, moy eventually reploce PDMs, which he finds unsavory.
Unsovory os nucleor deter r ence moy seem, we hove argued thot it con be grounded in game-theoretic rationolity, given threots of r etoliation that have a sufficiently high probobilit y of being cor ried out. We are not, by the way, suggesting thot the throw of dice or the spin of o roulette wheel should determine whether an American president or o Soviet g enerol secretary will retaliate against a first strike but rather that the uncertainties of retaliation are already inherent in C'I -and its possible b r eakdown.
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Thus, a PDM, in substantial part devoid of human inter vention, would appear to be a rational mechanism for stabilizing deterrence. But when it is shorn of its human element and rests so heavily on impersonal detection devices, computers, and the like, there would appear to be something inhumane and even morally repugnant in threotening horrendaus destruction in order to deter a first strike. Should millians of innocent civilians be held hostage to maintoin the proverbial 'delicate balance of terror'? Star Wors holds out the promise of forestolling a preemptive strike by preventing many first -strike weapons from getting through, using one or more shields. lf this attack can be stopped or lorgely blunted, then presumably the potential preemptor will think twice about attacking in the first place. Moreover, even if he does ottock, his attack will not be nearly so effective as it would in the absence of a missile defense, thereby decreasing the value of striking fir st.
This argument for a strategic defense does not hinge on its being totally impenetrable, or 'leakproof', but insteod on its lowering the expected payoff to an attacker of a first strike. Consequently, deterrence will be enhanced, which is today the primory justification the Reagan administration uses for Star Wars in light of the apparent impossibility of building a leakproof defense, at least in the foreseeable future.
However, the other side of the coin is thot, with a Star War s defense, each side will be able to degrade the effectiveness of a (retaliatory) second strike. This degradation will be especially upsetting if each side can be crippled or seriously damoged by a first strike, diminishing greatly its capacity to retaliate and thereby undermining deterrence. lf a Star Wars defense is in fact possible, the key question is: Will the enhancement of deterrence, by making a first strike more uncertoin, be offset by the undermining of deterrence because one's capability to retaliate, .Particularly afte r a devostoting first strike, will be undercut?
We ignore here the enormaus costs of building a Star Wars system. Our focus is solely on the strategic e~fects of Star Wors on deterrence, assuming thot deterrence in some form will not be obandoned, at least until Star Wors is perfected. Yet the perfection of Star Wars, · to the point that it becomes a leakproof system, is surely an extremely remote possibility.
To analyze the deterrence-enhancing versus the deterrence-undermining effects of Star Wors, we assume that Star Wars puts Iimits on the maximum first and second strikes of each player in the Deterrence Game (Broms/ Kilgour 1986) . That is, we introduce as new parometers in this game constraints on how far, say, Row can shift the outcome from (3,3) to (4,2) in a moximol first strike, and, in turn, how for Column, after suffering 0 first strike, ean shift the outeome from (4,2) -or wherever the game is after the first strike -toward ( 1,1) and full retaliation.
We posit three different seenarios that assume different funetional relationships between eaeh side's first and seeond strike defense. Then we Iet these defenses vary from no defense to perfeet defense, subjeet to these relationships. We will not try to deseribe the different seenarios here but instead will surnnarlze our principal results, based on all the seenarios.
Generally, we find that, for low Ievels of strategic defense, deterrenee ean be malntained. The reason is that eaeh side's threat of retaliation is still sufflcient to deter an opponent from preemption, but as defenses improve thls threat loses its foree and the stability of (3,3) in the Deterrence Game is jeopardized.
At a ealculable threshold value of defense, deterrence breaks down and it becomes rational for each side to attack the other. Not only can neither side be deterred by the threat of retaliation when its defense ls sufficiently strong, but it also does better attacking preemptively than retaliating after being attacked. This is a disturbing development, for it render s mutual preemption a Nash equilibrium in the Deterrence Game with Star Wars or simply the Star Wars Game; this outcome is never stable in the absence of Star Wars. (True, unilateral preemption to (4,2) and (2,4) are also Nash equllibria in the Deterrence Game, but given p r eeommitted threats by both sides above the threshold Ievel ealculated earlier, they are dominated by the choice of (3, 3).) In the Star Wars Game, by cantrast, both sides may find it advantageaus to attack each other simultaneously because, if each has a strong enough defense, neither side's threats of retallation will be sufficient to deter an opponent.
Actually, an equality or near equality in the defenses of the two sides retards mutual preemption, whereas an imbalance in defenses aggravates it. For if one side has a much stronger Star Wars defense than the other, by attacking first lt might be able to so weaken its opponent that it can effeetively stop whatever retaliation the opponent can throw back. But the opponent can make thls ealculation, too, and realize that it would do better attacking itself -given it is about to be preempted -resulting in mut-ual preemption. Such preemption may be arrested either by credible threats of retallation or, if less than eredible, a mutual realization by the players that not attacking is still better than attacking with strong but not neeessarily impenetrable defenses.
In our different scenarios, both mutual preemption and deterrence, as weil as unilateral preemption, are Nash equilibria for cer tain Ievels of defense; conditions under which one equilibrium may dominate another when they coexist are investigated. Perhops the greatest peril occurs when there is no deterrence equlibrium. Then an extreme form of crisis instability may grip the players and Iead them to an abyss . More probable in superpower relations, though, is that deterrence will remein reasonably secure, mainly because both sides have largely invulnerable second-strike capabilities ( principally, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles) that Star Wars will have no effect on, at least presently.
At some point, however, perhops in a severe crisis, cras1s stability could be upset and preemption, perhops even mutual preemption, might appear attractive. This has occurred at lower Ievels of superpower conflict, usual-1 y th rou g h su r rogates, in different parts of the world. If we are to steer clear of nuclear preemption as a rational option, it is imperative that the superpowers recognize that they must carefully chart a course of balanced development of Star Wars defenses -if these ever become feasible -to ovoid creating major instabilities, particularly in the period of transition from deterrence to defense.
The replacement of a deterrent policy depending on PDMs by a defensive posture grounded in Star Wars is not imminent. Until it occurs, it behooves us to understand the logic of nuclear deterrence and to improve upon it through calculations that make it as robust as possible. Star Wars, as we have madeled it, seems mastly an assault on this strotegic logic.
Note
The first part of this paper on deterrence is a slightly revised version of Brams/Kilgou r ( 1986b), but the secend part on Star War s is new. The material on deterrence is based in part on Broms ( 1985, eh. 1 ) and the several papers on deterrence and threats cited in the text. The madels in these papers and others on escalation in an arms race, crisis stability, verification of arms-contrpl agreements, and winding down if deterrence fails are developed within a comman framewerk in Broms/ Kilgour (1988) 
